A Real Threat or a Mere Shadow? School Chaplaincy Programs and the Secular State by Ahdar, Rex
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2632037 
 
A REAL THREAT OR A MERE SHADOW? SCHOOL 
CHAPLAINCY PROGRAMS AND THE SECULAR STATE 
 
REX TAUATI AHDAR* 
 
 
I   INTRODUCTION 
 
Williams v Commonwealth1 is an important decision for many reasons. In this 
article I shall focus on the broader normative arguments concerning state-funded 
chaplains, specifically those in public schools.2 I will address each of the principal 
objections to publicly-funded school chaplains, and endeavour to answer each one. The 
main criticisms of school chaplains and the Australian Federal Government’s National 
School Chaplaincy and Student Welfare Program3 (‘NSCSWP’), as it is now called, 
can be usefully drawn from an article by Greens member of the New South Wales 
Upper House, Dr John Kaye.4 After considering the major objections, I will next 
briefly discuss the religious test argument and then conclude with some brief thoughts 
on the compatibility of chaplaincies with the secular state.  
The US Supreme Court once had to decide whether legislative chaplains paid out 
of the public purse were a ‘real threat’ under the Constitution versus a ‘mere shadow’ 
on the Establishment Clause.5 For over a century, chaplains compensated out of public 
funds had said a prayer at the start of each day’s proceedings of the Nebraska state 
legislature.6 The majority of the Supreme Court concluded the paid chaplains 
represented no ‘real threat’ to religious freedom nor to the principle of the non-
establishment of religion.7 That same conclusion ought to be reached in respect of 
state-funded school chaplains in Australia.  
 
 
II  VIOLATION OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 
 
Providing funding to school chaplains runs counter to the separation of church and 
state ... Public funding of chaplains puts the state in the compromised position of 
financially supporting and being seen to endorse specific religions. It reopens old 
wounds about state religions and it excludes those who subscribe to no religion. It is 
the first step on a very slippery slope that, in the long run benefits very few sectors of 
the multicultural and multi-religious society.8 
 
                                                
*  Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Otago. This article is a revised version of a paper 
presented at the ‘After Williams’ Colloquium, School of Law, University of Southern 
Queensland, Toowoomba, 4 October 2013. 
1  [2012] HCA 23. 
2  State-funded chaplains are, it seems, also operating in religious schools: see the Australian 
Government, National School Chaplaincy and Student Welfare Program Guidelines, June 
2013, 5.2. 
3  The original National School Chaplaincy Program, begun in 2007, was broadened and 
became the National School Chaplaincy and Student Welfare Program in September 2011. 
4  John Kaye, ‘Preaching to the Unconverted: Chaplaincy on Trial’, Viewpoint, No 6, June 
2011, 27. <http://www.viewpointmagazine.com.au/> (hereafter ‘Kaye’). 
5  Marsh v Chambers, 463 US 783, 7954, 818 (1983) (quoting Goldberg J in Abington School 
District v Schempp, 374 US 203, 308 (1963)). 
6  Ibid 794. 
7  Ibid 791, 794 
8  Kaye, above n 4, 28, 30 (italics supplied). 
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The phrase ‘separation of church and state’ is not found in s 116 of the Australian 
Constitution. It is even not found in the American Constitution. It is a phrase that has, 
nonetheless, entered into global currency. It originates from a letter by Thomas 
Jefferson to a committee of the Danbury Baptists Association in 1802.9  
 
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his 
God. ... I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole of the American 
people which declared that their Legislature should ‘make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof’, thus building a wall 
of separation between church and State. Adhering to this expression of the supreme 
will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience.10  
 
(Perhaps Jefferson adopted the phrase from Roger Williams who wrote, in 1643, 
of ‘the wall of separation between the garden of the Church and the wilderness of the 
state.’)11Interestingly, Jefferson was not implying that politics and religion be kept 
apart.12 In the very next paragraph of his Danbury letter, President Jefferson wrote he 
would offer up a prayer on behalf of his correspondents.13 
 The phrase, wall of separation between church and state, was plucked from the 
relative obscurity of the personal correspondence of one of the America’s Founders 
and came to public prominence after it was quoted in the first Supreme Court decision 
on the Free Exercise Clause,14 Reynolds v United States in 1879,15 and in the first case 
on the Establishment Clause, Everson v Board of Education in 1947.16 (As it happens, 
Everson also involved state funding of a program run in public schools.)17 Arlin Adams 
and Charles Emmerich observe that the Supreme Court in Everson, ‘raised the figure 
of speech to constitutional status’18 when it asserted that Jefferson’s words captured the 
intent behind the clause against establishment of religion. In that decision the Court 
opined: ‘The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall 
must be kept high and impregnable.’19  
Since then it has taken on something of a life of its own. Its popularity is matched 
only by its controversial nature. American judges have often criticized its overuse and 
its invocation as a sort of mantra to scupper any relationship that might be forged 
                                                
9  Arlin M Adams and Charles J Emmerich, A Nation Dedicated to Religious Liberty: The 
Constitutional Heritage of the Religion Clauses (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990) 23. 
10  Thomas Jefferson, ‘Reply to the Danbury Baptists Association, 1 January 1802’ in H 
Washington (ed) The Writings of Jefferson, vol 8 (1853) 113: quoted by the Supreme Court 
in Reynolds v United States 98 US 145, 164 (1879). See further Douglas Laycock, ‘The 
Many Meanings of Separation’ (2003) 70 University of Chicago Law Review 1667, 1677-78. 
11  John Witte Jr and Joel A Nichols, Religion and the American Constitutional Experiment 
(Westview Press, 3rd ed, 2011) 27. 
12  John Witte Jr, God’s Joust, God’s Justice: Law and Religion in the Western Tradition (Wm. 
B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2006) 228. 
13  Jefferson wrote (ibid): ‘I reciprocate your kind prayers for the protection and blessing of the 
common father and creator of man.’ 
14  The Free Exercise Clause is taken from the latter words of the first sentence of the First 
Amendment and the Establishment Clauses from the opening words of that sentence, viz: 
‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof …’. 
15  98 US 145, 164 (1879). 
16  330 US 1 (1947). 
17  The Everson majority held that a local New Jersey board of education was entitled to 
reimburse parents for the expenditures on their children’s bus fares as they attended Catholic 
schools. Transportation reimbursement for children attending public schools was already in 
place. 
18  Above n 9, 23. 
19  Everson, 330 US 1, 18 (1947). 
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between the state and religious organizations. Justice Reed, dissenting in McCollum, 
cautioned ‘A rule of law should not be drawn from a figure of speech.’20 Justice 
Stewart, dissenting in Schempp, warned: 
 
It is a fallacious oversimplification to regard [the religious clauses language] as 
establishing a single constitutional standard of ‘separation of church and state,’ which 
can be mechanically applied in every case to delineate the required boundaries 
between government and religion. We err in the first place if we do not recognize, as a 
matter of history and as a matter of the imperatives of our free society, that religion 
and government must necessarily interact in countless ways. ... The two relevant 
clauses of the First Amendment cannot accurately be reflected in a sterile metaphor 
which by its very nature may distort rather than illumine the problems involved in a 
particular case.21 
 
In 1971, the Supreme Court explained that: 
 
[Our] prior holdings do not call for a total separation between church and state; total 
separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Fire inspections, building and zoning 
regulations, and state requirements under compulsory school-attendance laws are 
examples of necessary and permissible contacts. ... [T]he line of separation, far from 
being ‘a wall’, is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the 
circumstances of a particular relationship.22  
 
More blunt was Rehnquist J who, dissenting in Wallace v Jaffree, castigated 
reliance on this metaphor explaining that the ‘wall of separation between church and 
state is a metaphor based on bad history, a metaphor that has proved useless as a guide 
to judging. It should be frankly and explicitly abandoned.’23  
Scholars, in the main, have been no less scathing. The Everson Court elevated 
separation of church and state as ‘a constitutional end in itself, [an] historic move [that] 
was as unreflective as it was fateful.’24 The ‘separation of church and state’ lacked 
historical authority and foundation.25 Douglas Laycock notes the phrase is ‘deeply 
entrenched’ in American society and people will not quit using it. It is galling then that 
it ‘has no sufficiently agreed meaning to be of any use, and until we develop 
vocabulary that communicates distinct theories of separation, we should give up using 
the phrase altogether.’26 For John Witte Jr the metaphor unfortunately became ‘a 
mechanical and monopolistic test that courts applied bluntly, even slavishly, in a whole 
series of cases.’27 Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager lament that ‘[q]uestions 
about the “height of the wall” inevitably push public debate in grand, speculative and 
ideological directions’ and that ‘metaphors and slogans about walls and separation can 
never provide a sensible conceptual apparatus for the analysis of religious liberty.’28 
The famous wall of separation metaphor, scolds Andrew Koppelman, ‘which has been 
                                                
20  Illinois ex rel McCollum v Board of Education, 333 US 203, 247 (1948). 
21  Abington School District v Schempp, 374 US 203, 308-309 (1963) (italics mine). 
22  Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 US 602, 614 (1971) (italics mine). 
23  472 US 38, 107 (1985). 
24  Mary Ann Glendon and Raul F Yanes, ‘Structural Free Exercise’ (1991) 90 Michigan Law 
Review 477, 481. 
25  Philip Hamburger, ‘Against Separation’, Public Interest (2004) Spring 177,178-180. 
26  Laycock, above n 10, 1700. 
27  Witte, above n 12, 209. 
28  Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager, Religious Freedom and the Constitution 
(Harvard University Press, 2007) 18, 22-23. 
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the focus of enormous contestation, does not entail any particular set of legal rules’, 
which bears out ‘its useless indeterminancy’29. 
 
 
III   ‘SEPARATIONISM’ IN AUSTRALIAN JURISPRUDENCE 
 
How well has the separation of church and state maxim travelled? Has the 
metaphor, and the philosophy it represents, been accepted by the Australian courts 
interpreting s 116? Have the judges erected the wall ‘down under’? Has strict ‘no-aid 
separationism’30 been followed? 
The short answer is ‘no’. The more than century-old presence of an anti-
establishment prohibition has not given rise to the erection of such a wall in 
Australia.31 Bishop and historian, Tom Frame’s short but (in my view) eminently 
sensible monograph is aptly subtitled, Australia’s Imaginary Wall.32  
Section 116 of the Constitution begins: ‘The Commonwealth shall not make any 
law for establishing any religion ...’ The Establishment Clause has had a negligible 
effect upon religious practice in Australia.33 Certainly, its impact has been nothing like 
the sustained, if decidedly uneven, secularising effect that its American First 
Amendment counterpart (upon which section 116 was modelled)34 has had. There have 
been very few cases upon it and s 116 has never been invoked to strike down a law.35 
First, s 116 (unlike its American equivalent) places no restriction upon the States 
when it comes to legislative measures regarding religious matters and it is only a 
limitation upon ‘the Commonwealth’, or Federal Parliament, in this respect.36  
Second, the High Court in the leading, indeed only, case to reach it on the 
meaning of the anti-establishment provision, Attorney-General of Victoria, ex rel Black 
v Commonwealth (the DOGS Case),37 gave the clause a narrow reading. The 
                                                
29  Andrew Koppelman, Defending American Religious Neutrality (Harvard University Press, 
2013) 205, n 16. 
30  See Michael McConnell, ‘Neutrality, Separation and Accommodation: Tensions in 
American First Amendment Doctrine’ in Rex Ahdar (ed), Law and Religion (Ashgate, 2000) 
ch 4, 69-74.  
31  ‘Instead of the wall of separation in the US, the Australian pattern provides for equitable 
support for religions from the state. Instead of a doctrine of non-entanglement in the US, the 
Australian tradition has a doctrine of equitable entanglement.’: Bruce Kaye, ‘Is the Emperor 
Wearing the Wrong Clothes? Human Rights and Social Good in the Context of Australian 
Secularity: Theological Perspectives’ in Paul Babie and Neville Rochow (eds), Freedom of 
Religion under Bills of Rights (University of Adelaide Press, 2012) ch 3, 48. 
32  Thomas Frame, Church and State: Australia’s Imaginary Wall (University of New South 
Wales Press, 2006). For some the absence of a wall of separation is most regrettable: see eg 
Max Wallace, The Purple Economy: Supernatural Charities, Tax and the State (Australian 
National Secular Association, 2007) part 1A and the submission of the Australia New 
Zealand Secular Association quoted in Australian Human Rights Commission, 2011 
Freedom of Religion and Belief in 21st Century Australia (2011) 47. 
<http://www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/2011-freedom-religion-and-belief-21st-
century-australia> 
33  See generally Reid Mortensen, ‘The Unfinished Experiment: A Report on Religious 
Freedom in Australia’ (2007) 21 Emory International Law Review 167, 170, 173-175; Tony 
Blackshield, ‘Religion and Australian Constitutional Law’ in Peter Radan et al (eds), Law 
and Religion: God, the State and the Common Law (Routledge, 2005) ch 4, 85-86, 98-101. 
34  See Murphy J in the DOGS Case (1981) 146 CLR 559, 621; Mortensen, above n 33, 169. 
35  George Williams, Human Rights under the Australian Constitution (Oxford University 
Press, 2002) 111. 
36  See Wilson J in the DOGS Case (1981) 146 CLR 559, 652. 
37  Ibid. 
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Establishment Clause prevents the Federal Legislature from purposefully38 creating a 
national church or religion. It does not, as the appellants, the Defence of Government 
Schools (‘DOGS’) organization contended, preclude the Commonwealth from passing 
legislation providing for financial assistance to be given to non-governmental religious 
schools. Mason J stated:  
 
The first clause in the section forbids the establishment or recognition (and by this 
term I would include a branch of a religion or church) as a national institution. ... to 
constitute ‘establishment’ of a ‘religion’ the concession to one church of favours, titles 
and advantages must be of so special a kind that it enables us to say that by virtue of 
the concession the religion has become established as a national institution, as, for 
example, by becoming the official religion of the State.39 
 
An expansive separationist reading was thus expressly rejected. Stephen J 
explained: 
  
The very form of s 116, consisting of four distinct and express restrictions upon 
legislative power, is also significant. It cannot readily be viewed as the repository of 
some broad statement of principle concerning the separation of church and state, from 
which may be distilled the detailed consequences of such separation. On the contrary, 
by fixing upon four specific restrictions of legislative power, the form of the section 
gives no encouragement to the undertaking of any such distillation.40  
 
For Wilson J, ‘The separationist view of establishment ... [did] not sit well with 
the form of s. 116, addressed as it [was] only to the Commonwealth Parliament. ... If 
the first clause [no establishment] is to be read, as the plaintiffs contend, as requiring 
the erection of a ‘wall of separation’ between the church and the state, then it is 
difficult to see what room is left for the operation of the following [three] clauses.’41  
The DOGS Court’s interpretation coincides with the view expounded by 
Professor Reid Mortensen that, even though modelled on its US counterpart, ‘it is 
questionable that the Commonwealth clause [s 116] was originally intended to 
incorporate the concept of separation of church and state that the United States 
Supreme Court has subsequently read into the First Amendment clause.’42 It would be 
anachronistic to assert that separationism was in the Founders’ minds:43 the strict 
separationist stance first appeared in the post-World War II American Religion Clause 
case law, a half century after the Framers turned their energies to the content of the 
Australian Constitution.  
Murphy J dissented vigorously in the DOGS case. He charged that the majority’s 
narrow reading, rejecting the separationist construction, was tantamount to interpreting 
s 116 as if it were a mere ‘clause in tenancy agreement rather than a great 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of and from religion.’44 A reading that did not 
curtail a law that supported any religion but only a law that prevented the setting up of 
                                                
38  The High Court majority placed great weight (‘bloated significance’ in Dr Mortensen’s 
opinion, above n 33, 174) upon the word ‘for’, a word not found in the US counterpart 
(which refers to ‘respecting’ an establishment of religion). 
39  DOGS Case (1981) 146 CLR 559, 612. See similarly Barwick CJ at 582; Gibbs J at 597 and 
604; Aickin J at 635, agreed with Gibbs and Mason JJ.  
40  Ibid, 609 (Stephen J). 
41  Ibid, 654 (Wilson J). 
42  Reid G Mortensen, The Secular Commonwealth: Constitutional Government, Law and 
Religion (Ph D Thesis in Law, University of Queensland, 1993) 223. 
43  The debates and speeches in the lead up to s 116 do not shed much light on the intention of 
the founders: Ibid 189-191; Mortensen, above n 33, 169. 
44  DOGS Case (1981) 146 CLR 559, 623.  
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a nation church simply ‘ma[d]e a mockery of s.116.’45 For him, the majority’s narrow 
reading ‘would deny that s. 116 [was] a guarantee of freedom from religion as well as 
of religion.’46 Murphy J’s was a lone voice in the Court however. 
The decidedly cool reception of separationism in Australia was wise, for the 
heyday of strict separationism has passed in the United States. From approximately 
1947 to 1989, notes John Witte Jr, the US Supreme Court ‘applied its newly-minted 
separationist logic’ to invalidate many instances of government support for religion in 
the public school system. Yet, he continued, ‘it is also well-known that the Supreme 
Court of late has abandoned much of this strict separationism in favour of other 
principles of religious liberty – neutrality, accommodation, noncoercion, equal 
treatment and nonendorsement most prominently.’47 
 
 
IV   OPPORTUNITY FOR PROSELYTISING 
 
In as much as the NSCP provides direct funding to maintain the foot soldiers of 
various denominations, it is a direct flow of public money across the separation. … the 
unwritten contract between the parents and the system is that no religion will be 
marketed at their children. … Many other parents reject all religions and seek to 
protect their children from proselytising until they are old enough to form their own 
mature opinions. … The NSCP not only creates the perception of publicly-funded 
individuals who are likely to cross that line, but also in some cases the reality.48 
 
 Consistent with the idea of separation of church and state, critics see the 
danger of school chaplains proselytising to vulnerable children. However, supporters 
of chaplaincy point out that the NSCSWP Guidelines expressly forbid this, and they do 
so in some detail. A lengthy quotation is merited:  
 
Services provided during Program funded hours must not include: 
 
• providing religious education in their schools. The decision on whether non 
Program funded religious education is delivered by the same person who is 
employed with Program funding is to be determined by schools and Funding 
Recipients. However, to avoid potential role confusion, best practice recommends 
that these roles be conducted by different persons. Where this is not a school 
preference / not possible, schools need to ensure they take all necessary steps to 
delineate the roles, including on the school website ... 
• attempting to convert students to a religion or set of beliefs through 
proselytising/evangelising. School chaplains/student welfare workers must not 
o coerce students to attend activities that have religious content / focus 
o ask or encourage students to proselytise/evangelise within the school 
o deliver activities/services that promote a particular view or religious 
belief without prior approval and consent as per Sections 3.1 and 5.2 
o put students in a position of feeling manipulated or intruded upon by 
intense persuasive conversation. 
• initiating faith discussions with a view to coercing or manipulating students to a 
particular view or spiritual belief. While recognising that an individual school 
                                                
45  Ibid 633. 
46  Ibid 624. 
47  John Witte Jr, ‘That Serpentine Wall of Separation’ (2000) 101 Michigan Law Review 1869, 
1904. See similarly McConnell, above n 30, 73-74 (but placing the shift in the tide some 8 
years earlier with the ruling in Widmar v Vincent, 454 US 263 (1981)); Glendon and Yanes, 
above n 24, 517-18, 532-33 (by the mid-1980s the hold of strict separationism had begun to 
decline in the Supreme Court).  
48  Kaye, above n 4, 30 (italics mine). 
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chaplain/student welfare worker may respond to questions and in good faith 
express views and articulate values consistent with his or her own beliefs, a 
school chaplain/student welfare worker must not take advantage of his or her 
privileged position to proselytise, evangelise or advocate for a particular view or 
spiritual belief 
• attempting to undermine students’ religious or other beliefs 
• using other methods such as social media – blogs and Facebook, or newsletters 
and school websites, to proselytise/evangelise to students within their school, in 
their role as a Program funded school chaplain/student welfare worker.49 
 
But critics respond that, first, regardless of what the rules say, the incentive will 
be there still to do so and, secondly, there is evidence that proselytising has indeed 
occurred.  
As for the first charge, some contend that to expect chaplains not to evangelise is 
to expect them to do something in direct conflict with their training: ‘It’s like asking 
someone with dental training to work as a general practitioner.’50 The analogy is not 
apt. The better way to have put it would be to say: ‘It is like asking a general 
practitioner not to treat kidney disease or (these days) to deliver babies’ – and that is 
hardly something a GP would cavil at. The chaplain is a religious GP who could turn 
his or her hand to evangelism, but that is not his or her specialty, nor the prime focus of 
the chaplain’s training, any more than opthalmology or orthopaedics is for a general 
medical practitioner. 
Regarding the evidence to date, it would be naïve to believe there have been no 
instances where some chaplains have ‘crossed the line’. Allegations were made that 
evangelising had taken place in Victoria, although Bishop Stephen Hale denied that any 
such thing had been occurring.51 Nonetheless, there are powerful incentives against 
chaplains proselytising that a school, funding recipient and chaplain herself would be 
unwise to ignore. A school would risk losing the funding entirely for the immediate 
future and a chaplain would incur the stigma and embarrassment of being dismissed 
whilst bringing odium upon the denomination or parachurch organization to which he or 
she belonged. Furthermore, the Guidelines lay down detailed mandatory complaints 
handling and grievance resolution procedures,52 coupled with close monitoring and 
regular reporting53 of the on-the-ground operation of chaplains. Breaches of the Code of 
Conduct may see the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations 
require all or some of the funding to be repaid to the Government.54 The overzealous or 
imprudent chaplain who evangelizes would only do so once and the resultant publicity 
would certainly deter others who might be tempted to overstep the mark. 
                                                
49  NSCSWP Guidelines, above n 2, 3.1.2 (italics added). 
50  David Penberthy, ‘Let us pray that school chaplains are given the chop’, The Punch 
 <http://www.thepunch.com.au/articles/let-us-pray-that-school-chaplains-are-given-the-
chop/>. 
51  Jewel Topsfield, ‘We are not out to convert children in schools: bishop’, The Age, 14 May 
2011. A controversy arose after the Dr Evonne Paddison, chief executive of Access 
Ministries, the parachurch body that delivers religious education classes in Victoria, was 
reported as stating (in 2008) that, ‘What really matters is seizing the God-given opportunity 
we have to reach kids in schools. Without Jesus, our students are lost.’ Bishop Hale 
countered that what Dr Paddison stated in 2008 did not reflect what occurred in schools: ‘We 
are extremely respectful of the balancing act that’s involved in what we do,’ he said. ‘It’s 
clearly a pretty tricky exercise to go in and teach children Christian stories and Christian 
values and to not go over the top and seek to then contend that in such a way children feel 
like they are pressured to do something.’ 
52  NSCP Guidelines, above n 2, ss 5.6.5 and 7. 
53  Ibid s 6. Every school must have a Complaints Officer. 
54  Ibid s 7.1.6. 




V   ALIENATION OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES 
 
[I]n a profoundly multicultural and religiously diverse society, the placement of a 
representative of one belief system in a school sends an unacceptable message to 
children who come from a background that differs from the chaplain chosen by their 
institution. . . . For many public schools, no one chaplain can hope to reflect anything 
but a small subset of the beliefs and cultural practices of the students and their parents. 
At best the others will feel neglected and left out. At worst, the impression will be 
created that the school values their religion and hence themselves less than others.55 
 
Secularists tend to presume that religious minorities feel alienated when 
majoritarian religious practices are introduced or upheld. US Supreme Court judge, 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, promulgated a test for violation of the Establishment 
Clause that captures this objection, the so-called ‘Endorsement test’. The government 
ought be wary of endorsing religion since: ‘Endorsement sends a message to 
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and 
an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the 
political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message.’56 
But the critics seldom proffer evidence for this intuition. More often, the fear of 
alienating minorities is a pretext for secularising public programs and for the relentless 
evisceration of all traces of religion from public life and institutions. Interestingly, a 
leading British Muslim scholar, Tariq Modood, has rejected the plea for 
disestablishment of the Church of England and the creation of a thoroughly secular 
state. It is, he noted, ‘a brute fact’ that not a single article or speech could be found by 
any non-Christian faith in favour of disestablishment. Rather, secularists had been 
using minorities (claiming the desire to accommodate them) to justify courses of action 
that these secular elites had decided upon by themselves to advance their own 
purposes. Modood charged that ‘proposals to dismantle establishment in the name of 
multi-faithism must be viewed as disingenuous’57 and he castigated the attempt ‘to 
wrap a homogenising secular hegemony in the language of multi-culturalism and rights 
of minorities.’58 The most vocal critics of establishment in the name of religious 
pluralism were in fact usually atheists, rationalists, and the like, rather than Muslims, 
Sikhs, Hindus and the adherents of other minority religions, whose views, Modood 
wryly noted, were rarely solicited.59 
Furthermore, there is nothing in the NSCSWP to prevent persons from other 
religions from being appointed as chaplains. And, as for the plight of atheists, free 
thinkers, agnostics, humanists and so on, ‘student welfare workers’ were added to the 
Program from January 2012. These persons are expressly required to be non faith-
based or secular workers.60 
 
 
                                                
55  Kaye, above n 4, 28 (emphasis added). 
56  Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US 668, 688 (1984); County of Allegheny v ACLU, Greater 
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 US 573, 627 (1989). On the endorsement test in the US courts see 
eg Witte and Nichols, above n 11, 181-82. 
57  Tariq Modood, ‘Establishment, Multiculturalism and British Citizenship’ (1994) 65(1) 
Political Quarterly 53, 61. 
58  Ibid 63. 
59  Tariq Modood, ‘Introduction: Establishment, Reform and Multiculturalism’ in Tariq 
Modood (ed), Church, State and Religious Minorities (Policy Studies Institute, 1997) ch 1, 9. 
60  NSCP Guidelines, above n 2, s 1.1. 
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VI   EXPENSIVE, INEFFECTIVE AND RUN BY UNQUALIFIED AMATEURS 
 
In a cash-constrained education environment, spending money on enthusiastic but 
unqualified amateurs may not be the best use of resources. … The prioritising of 
chaplaincy, or religious education programs in general results in a deficit in other 
education funding areas. The $222 million allocated to the chaplaincy program 
exceeds the $200 million given to fund services for students with a disability. … The 
most remarkable feature of the NSCP has been the total absence of evidence that the 
program fulfils its goals. … There is a strong case that this money would be better 
used to employ qualified professional welfare workers. Doing so would provide more 
assurance to students and teachers that the welfare needs of students are being 
addressed.61 
 
The days of unqualified amateurs are numbered, as the Guidelines now require 
chaplains to have satisfied certain minimum qualifications.62 The question whether 
$222 million is too much is a surely perilous one for an outsider from the Shaky Isles 
to begin to answer. If the chaplaincy and student welfare worker program is working 
effectively then it seems to me that the benefits to society (intangible and difficult to 
quantify as they may be) of providing students and staff with timely support to 
overcome unexpected episodes of grief and to face personal crises63 is money well 
spent. The extensive reporting and monitoring mechanisms set out in the Guidelines 
are an attempt to systematically gauge the efficacy of the Program. To be fair, many of 
the goals of the program – for example, helping students explore their spirituality, 
enabling them to overcome or cope with crises, reducing bullying – hardly lend 
themselves to easy assessment. 
 
 
VII   IMPOSITION OF A ‘RELIGIOUS TEST’ FOR A COMMONWEALTH ‘OFFICE’ 
 
Section 116 of the Constitution states that ‘no religious test shall be required as a 
qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth.’64 
The High Court of Australia in Williams rejected the argument, in rather summary 
fashion, that a school chaplain was an ‘office under the Commonwealth’ and that the 
definition and requirements for the appointment of such chaplains imposed a religious 
test for that office. There was, curiously, no reference to the two High Court decisions 
which considered the application of the religious test clause.65 
For Gummow and Bell JJ, the term ‘office’ contemplated a ‘closer connection’ to 
the Government than the case at hand.66 The Government does not directly contract 
with chaplains but with their umbrella body (‘funding recipient’), in the case of 
Queensland, the Scripture Union of Queensland. In their Honours’ view, the fact that 
the Federal Government funded the SUQ was insufficient to render a chaplain 
appointed by the SUQ an office holder under the Commonwealth. There was said to be 
nothing in the case law on the religious test clause in the US Constitution – clearly the 
                                                
61  Kaye, above n 4, at 28, 31 (italics added). 
62  NSCP Guidelines, above n 2, s 5.5. 
63  Ibid s 3.1.1 (‘What do school chaplains/student welfare workers do?’). 
64  See generally Mortensen, above n 4, 283-288. ‘The test clause’, he observed, ‘reinforces the 
central assumption of secular government that the citizen’s religion is not, ipso facto, an 
indication of disloyalty, divided loyalty or an inability to contribute to the common good.’ 
65  As noted by Luke Beck, ‘Williams v Commonwealth: School Chaplains and the Religious 
Test Clause of the Constitution’ (2012) 38 Monash University Law Review 271, 276. The 
two cases are Crittenden v Anderson [1950] HCA 23 (23 August 1950); and Church of 
Scientology Inc v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25. 
66  Williams v Commonwealth [2012] HCA 23, [110]. 
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model for the Australian provision – that contradicted the High Court’s conclusion.67 
Article 6 states: ‘no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any 
Office or public Trust under the United States.’ 
Heydon J spent longer on the ‘office’ argument but concurred with his colleagues:  
 
An ‘office’ is a position under constituted authority to which duties are attached. That 
suggests that an ‘officer’ is a person who holds an office which is in direct relationship 
with the Commonwealth and to which qualifications may attach before particular 
appointments can be made or continued.68 
 
Here, the Federal Government had no legal relationship with the chaplains, let 
alone a direct one. ‘It cannot appoint, select, approve or dismiss them. It cannot 
direct them. The services they provide in a particular school are determined by those 
who run that school. The provision of those services is overseen by school 
principals.’ Heydon J criticized the plaintiff’s construction of ‘office’ under s 116 as 
‘unattractive’69 in terms of its potentially wide sweep. It would mean that whenever 
the Federal Government entered into contracts pursuant to which services were to be 
furnished by persons with whom the Commonwealth had no legal relationship, that 
party would nonetheless still hold an ‘office’. That would ‘radically expand s 
75(v)’70 (which refers to ‘officer of the Commonwealth’). 
This seems right. If, for example, a school contracted out cleaning services to a 
private firm, then, under the plaintiff’s construction, the janitors employed by that firm 
would be ‘officers’. Thousands of persons who work for organizations with whom the 
government has contracted to provide social services – faith-based providers such as 
Catholic Social Services or the Salvation Army come to mind – would suddenly be 
transformed into Government officers. That would surprise those workers. The wide 
interpretation seems unwieldy and impracticable. The plaintiff submitted that ‘if his 
proposed construction of s 116 were not adopted, the Commonwealth could evade s 
116 by engaging subcontractors to perform its activities and stipulating that those 
subcontractors employ only adherents to a particular religious faith.’71 That argument 
does not follow. If the Commonwealth could stipulate to the principal contractor (with 
whom it has a direct relationship) that subcontractors (with whom the Government has 
no relationship) be of a particular religion (or race, gender and so on) then the 
Commonwealth would have a measure of control and direction over their selection and 
dismissal. The relationship would no longer be remote but resemble the ‘closer 
connection’ that Gummow and Bell JJ considered marked officers. 
Heydon J commented curtly that it was unnecessary to deal with the plaintiff’s 
‘somewhat controversial’72 submission that the eligibility criteria imposed a religious 
test. But he had in fact earlier in his opinion traversed the issue. The NSCP Guidelines 
stipulated that chaplains had to be recognised ‘through formal ordination, 
commissioning, recognised qualifications or endorsement by a recognised or accepted 
religious institution or a state/territory government approved chaplaincy service.’73 
But, he added, the Guidelines also provided that ‘In particular circumstances, secular 
pastoral care workers may be employed under this program.’74 (These, as it transpired, 
have now been added to the Program.) The services to be delivered to the school and 
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72  Ibid [448]. 
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its community spoke of ‘general religious and personal advice’, ‘comfort and support’ 
to students and staff whilst respecting the religious beliefs and views of all those to 
whom they might render their services. In Heydon J’s view, the Guidelines:  
 
conveyed the impression that, at least at this school, neither the NSCP nor the 
qualification for ‘chaplains’ had much to do with religion in any specific or sectarian 
sense. The work described could have been done by persons who met a religious test. 
It could equally have been done by persons who did not.75 
 
The very label ‘chaplain’ was perhaps an unnecessarily misleading if not 
inflammatory one – as the present case demonstrated – and his Honour wryly offered 
some milder, less provocative and more apt job titles for a multicultural, post-Christian 
society such as Australia: 
 
In ordinary speech a ‘chaplain’ is the priest, clergyman or minister of a chapel; or a 
clergyman who conducts religious services in the private chapel of an institution or 
household. Those who are ‘school chaplains’ under the NSCP's auspices fall outside 
these definitions. Their duties in schools are unconnected with any chapel. They 
conduct no religious services. Perhaps those supporting validity committed an error in 
calling the NSCP a ‘chaplaincy program’ and speaking of ‘school chaplains’. The 
language is inaccurate and may have been counterproductive. Some vaguer expression, 
more pleasing to 21st century ears, like ‘mentor’ or ‘adviser’ or ‘comforter’ or 
‘counselor’ or even ‘consultant’, might have had an emollient effect. The plaintiff 
must have found the words ‘chaplain’ and ‘chaplaincy’ useful for his contention that 
the NSCP was void under s 116.76 
 
 
VIII  CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
When viewed in isolation, the principle of separation of church and state serves 
religious liberty best when it is used prudentially not categorically. Separationism 
needs to be retained. … The principle of separation of church and state, however, also 
needs to be contained, and not used as an anti-religious weapon in the culture wars of 
the public square, public school, or public court. Separationism must be viewed as a 
shield not a sword in the great struggle to achieve religious liberty for all. A 
categorical insistence on the principle of separation of church and state avails us rather 
little. James Madison warned already in 1833 that ‘it may not be easy, in every 
possible case, to trace the line of separation between the rights of Religion and the 
Civil authority, with such distinctness, as to avoid collisions & doubts on unessential 
points.’ This caveat has become even more salient today.77 
 
The line of separation between religious communities and civil government is one 
that will always be contestable. Justice Jackson was prescient in predicting in 1948 that 
it would be ‘as winding as the famous serpentine wall designed by Mr Jefferson for the 
University he founded.’78 
Can one maintain the ideal of a ‘secular Commonwealth’ and still have taxpayer-
funded school chaplaincy programmes? Secular Commonwealth describes 
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‘government in which as nearly as practicable, religion is regarded as irrelevant to a 
citizen’s political, legal, social and economic status.’79 
The answer, I suggest, is ‘yes’. The secular state can and does take many forms 
globally. Some secular states subscribe to ‘hostile’ or ‘hard’ secularism.80 Here, 
religion is inexorably equated with irrationality, superstition and raw emotion and thus 
is to be excluded as far as possible from public spaces, programmes and institutions. 
‘Programmatic secularism’, as the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan 
Williams, prefers to label it, 
 
assumes ... that any religious or ideological system demanding a hearing in the public 
sphere is aiming to seize control of the political realm and to override and nullify 
opposing convictions. It finds views of the human good outside a minimal account of 
material security and relative social stability unsettling, and concludes that they need 
to be relegated to the purely private sphere. It assumes that the public expression of 
specific conviction is automatically offensive to people of other (or no) conviction. 
Thus public support or subsidy directed towards any particular group is a collusion 
with elements that subvert the harmony of society as a whole.81 
 
But neither this kind of assertive laicist secular state nor this type of repressive 
secularism has found much favour in Australia. As Mortensen noted, ‘of the 
institutions of secular government only “the separation of church and state” has failed 
to receive some expression in Australia.’82 Despite the attempts by earnest strict 
separationists (who advocate a high wall of separation), Australian political culture has 
accepted a more accommodating version of the secular state, one that instantiates a 
‘benevolent’ or ‘open’ version of secularism. It is comfortable with what Rowan 
Williams calls ‘procedural secularism’. 
 
Procedural secularism is the acceptance by state authority of a prior and irreducible 
other or others; it remains secular, because as soon as it systematically privileged one 
group it would ally its legitimacy with the sacred and so destroy its otherness; but it 
can move into and out of alliance with the perspectives of faith, depending on the 
varying and unpredictable outcomes of honest social argument, and can collaborate 
without anxiety with communities of faith in the provision, for example, of education or 
social regeneration.83 
 
Political affirmation of secularism of this latter, benevolent sort is what enables 
Cardinal George Pell to write that he can ‘rejoice in the separation of church and 
state’84 whilst nonetheless condemning the hard secularist no-aid stance of some 
opinion-makers in Australia. This type of ‘benign separation of church and state’85 is, 
for Pell, laudable. 
The indefatigable efforts of those such as Mr Ron Williams to belatedly introduce a 
strict form of American-style, no-aid separationism into Australia have consistently 
failed. They failed in the DOGS case and they failed again politically, if not necessarily 
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legally, in Canberra in the school chaplaincy case. (The ink in the High Court judgment 
was barely dry when the Federal Parliament passed a new statute authorising the funding 
of the national school chaplaincy program.)86 In truth, the national school chaplaincy 
program was never, to invoke the language of the US Supreme Court,87 ‘a real threat’ to 
religious freedom and a Secular Commonwealth, but was, at most, ‘a mere shadow’ upon 
those ideals. And shadows, as our parents taught us, cannot hurt us.88 
A wall of separation requires the solid, sun-baked ground of scepticism and 
religious hostility beneath it. It simply cannot be built on the soft and malleable soil of 
religious tolerance. So long as Australians till the ground of religious tolerance, 
understanding, non-coercion and neutrality, the conditions will remain inhospitable for 
the wall.  
                                                
86  It passed the Financial Framework Legislation Amendment Act (No 3) 2012 (Cth) on 28 
June, eight days after the High Court opinion was handed down. The Explanatory 
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